The class of ââ?¬Å?stable gamesââ?¬Â, introduced by Hofbauer and Sandholm in 2009,\r\nhas the attractive property of admitting global convergence to equilibria under many\r\nevolutionary dynamics. We show that stable games can be identified as a special case of\r\nthe feedback-system-theoretic notion of a ââ?¬Å?passiveââ?¬Â dynamical system. Motivated by this\r\nobservation, we develop a notion of passivity for evolutionary dynamics that complements\r\nthe definition of the class of stable games. Since interconnections of passive dynamical\r\nsystems exhibit stable behavior, we can make conclusions about passive evolutionary\r\ndynamics coupled with stable games. We show how established evolutionary dynamics\r\nqualify as passive dynamical systems. Moreover, we exploit the flexibility of the definition\r\nof passive dynamical systems to analyze generalizations of stable games and evolutionary\r\ndynamics that include forecasting heuristics as well as certain games with memory.
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